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Abstract
In this article, we develop a model for the evolution of real estate prices. A wide
range of inputs, including stochastic interest rates and changing demands for the asset,
are considered. Maximizing their expected utility, home owners make optimal sale
decisions given these changing market conditions. Using these optimal sale decisions,
we simulate the implied evolution of housing prices providing insights into the recent
subprime lending crisis.
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1 Introduction
The recent turmoil in financial markets triggered by defaults on subprime mortgages demon-
strates that home prices are largely driven by buyers’ demands. Indeed, in the early 2000s,
house prices rose to record levels due to the high demand for mortgages with easy credit.
The left-side graph in Figure 1 plots the Case-Shiller Composite-20 house-price index, which
shows that the prices peaked in 2006, were stable for a while, and subsequently decreased.
Figure 1 documents the level of mortgage rates and home inventories during the same pe-
riod. During the house price appreciation cycle (2000-2005), there is a sharp decrease in
mortgage rates and a slight increase in home inventories. Low mortgage rates result in an
increased demand for mortgages and housing. In contrast, the period with decreasing house
prices (2006-2007) corresponds to a sharp increase in mortgage rates and home inventories.
In this paper, we propose a mathematical model to explain the relation between house prices
and buyers’ demands using a market microstructure perspective. We consider both market
and personal shocks, and we analyze how these shocks affect the home owner’s optimal sale
decision and the resulting sale process. Our model can also be used to forecast the future
price evolution of house prices under different interest rate and demand scenarios.
Our paper is related to two topics in the literature: the optimal waiting time (OWT) and
the home sale price evolution. Time-on-the-market (TOM), time-to-sale, optimal marketing
time, and selling time are frequently used terms that have similar connotations to OWT even
though their exact economic definitions may differ 1. The existing literature in this area is
mostly empirical focusing on the sign of the correlation between the length of TOM and the
resulting sale price. Cubbin (1974) builds an econometric model to explain the relationship
between the list price and selling time using data from the Coventry housing market between
1968 and 1970. Cubbin finds that the higher the list price, the shorter the selling time. Miller
(1978) cannot confirm Cubbin’s conclusion using 83 sales from Columbus, Ohio. Miller’s
empirical study does not confirm the existence of an optimal selling time. Kalra, Chan and
Lai (1997) analyze 644 single-family house sales records in the Fargo-Moorhead metropolitan
1In our model, OWT is an upper bound for TOM.
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Figure 1: With the housing meltdown, the house-price index is falling, existing inventory is
piling up and current mortgage rate is significantly higher than its trough.
area to conclude that TOM and sale price are positively related. Genesove and Mayer (1998)
conclude from a study of the Boston condominium market that owners’ with a high loan-
to-value ratio have a longer time on the market and sell properties for higher prices. Taylor
(1999) studies the theoretical relationship between TOM and property quality. Knight (2002)
examines how changes in the list price impact the resulting TOM and sale price. In contrast,
our paper does not explicitly test the relationship between expected TOM and our model’s
parameters, but rather we investigate the relationship between OWT, list, and reservation
prices. In addition, we also examine the relationships between OWT and interest rates, and
order arrival and withdrawal intensities - which are not well-studied in the literature.
Many of the models studying TOM are based on information theory with search and
matching models. With their corresponding optimal stopping rules, these models have been
used to explain the behavior of buyers and sellers2. Buyers search until the marginal benefit
of continued search is equal to marginal cost, and similarly, sellers equate the marginal benefit
to the marginal cost of locating a bidder for their property. Haurin (1988) applies search
theory to investigate the relationship between the distribution of offers and the duration of
marketing time. His empirical study concludes that as the variance of the offer distribution
increases, the expected marketing time lengthens. Sarr (1988) examines the optimal list price
2Earlier search and matching models were used in labor economics, see Lucas and Prescott (1974).
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adjustment under demand uncertainty. Wheaton (1990) investigates the role of vacancy rates
in determining TOM, the reservation, and sale prices. He finds that greater vacancy increases
selling time, lowers the seller’s reservation price, and ultimately leads to lower market prices.
Although we do not study vacancy rates in our model, our findings are similiar to Wheaton’s
(1990) for a seller with a low reservation price. In this case, OWT increases and the seller
expects less from the transaction. Forgey, Rutherford and Springer incorporate liquidity
into a search model. Using data from 3358 single-family housing transactions, they conclude
that an optimal marketing period exists and properties with higher liquidity sell at a higher
price. Yavas (1992), Krainer and LeRoy (2002) and Williams (1995) also apply search and
matching theory to analyze the sale prices of illiquid assets. Our paper differs from these
papers in our modeling approach. We do not use a search and matching model, but instead
employ a market microstructure model. We incorporate the reservation price, the list price,
the distribution of offers, withdrawal rates for buyers’ offers, and deterministic and stochastic
interest rates. The seller’s motivation is captured by a time impatient utility function3. We
find the optimal selling time that maximizes the seller’s expected utility. OWT in our model
is set at the beginning of the sales process. Optimal timing of investment has been previously
studied in the case of known asset price dynamics by Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Evans,
Henderson and Hobson (2007). In our paper, we do not study the risk associated with the
waiting period - which is well-documented by Lin and Vandell (2007).
Real estate market price evolutions are considered in the second part of our paper. The
existing literature on price evolutions relies mostly on econometric models. Since the housing
market is heterogeneous in the qualities of the properties, most of the existing literature is
devoted to developing statistical techniques to overcome this heterogeneity by forming price
indices for geographical areas, see Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963), Case K. and Shiller
(1987), Case K. and Shiller (1990), Case B. and Quigley (1991), and Poterba, Weill and
Shiller (1991), Goetzmann and Peng (2006), and McMillen and Thorsnes (2006). Another
stream of literature uses equilibrium theory to estimate house price dynamics. Stein (1995)
3The existence of such a time impatience parameter is shown by Glower, Haurin and Hendershott (1998).
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explains the large swings in prices by introducing an equilibrium model with a down-payment
effect. Similarly, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) present a recursive equilibrium model that
accounts for income shocks and credit constraints. Capozza, Hendershott and Mack (2004)
use mean reversion and serial correlation to explain equilibrium house price dynamics. Our
model differs from this literature. We use the derived analytics from our OWT framework
and extend it to multiple selling periods to determine the price evolution. Given the linkage
between the seller and the buyer (e.g., the transaction price becomes the reservation price of
the buyer when he posts the property for sale), we construct a property price evolution by
tracking the expected sale price in the selling process. Our OWT framework enables us to
examine housing price movements under different interest rate and demand scenarios. We
model the timing of the decision of sale for each owner with random income and personal
shocks. Simulation shows that the fluctuation in housing prices are driven by interest rates,
demand for the asset, and reservation prices.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the model within the OWT
framework. We start with an auxiliary model, extend it to more realistic cases, and analyze
the comparative statistics of OWT with respect to model parameters. Section 3 applies our
model to the price evolution in the real estate market. Section 4 provides a simulation and
reflects on the subprime lending crisis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Sellers of illiquid real assets often face a difficult decision regarding how long they should
keep the asset on the market if they do not receive any offers matching the list price. If the
asset is highly desirable, the seller might remain undecided even in the case of receiving an
offer at the list price. He may wait an additional amount of time in hopes of receiving an
offer even greater than the list price. If he chooses to wait longer, he may lose the current
offer. As this discussion implies, the determination of the waiting time is complicated when
there is a mutual decision process between the seller and the buyer. This section analyzes the
5
optimal amount of time that a seller should wait in this mutual decision process to maximize
his expected payoff.
We consider two cases in our optimal waiting time (OWT) analysis. In the first, the
seller does not specify his final list price and accepts the highest available offer exceeding
his reservation price, R, at the end of the OWT. In the second, he publicly announces the
list price, L, and keeps the reservation price R private. He sells the asset if he receives an
offer greater than L; otherwise, he waits until the end of the OWT and then chooses the
best offer greater than R. We assume that buyers make offers at random times with random
magnitudes. Buyers may also withdraw their offers according to a known random process.
We begin with the mathematical formulation of an auxiliary model. We provide the
details of the derivation for this auxiliary model in the appendix. We then consider the two
cases: (i) where the reservation and list prices are private information, and (ii) where the
seller announces a pre-determined list price.
2.1 The Auxiliary Model
In the auxiliary model, the seller’s reservation price, denoted pmin, is public information (i.e.,
all of the offers that the seller receives are higher than pmin). We assume that the arrival
times of the buyers’ offers follow a one-dimensional Poisson point process with parameter λ,
and the magnitudes of their offers are uniformly distributed with U(pmin, pmax) where pmax
is finite. After making an offer, a buyer may withdraw his offer. The time to withdrawal is
assumed to follow an exponential distribution with parameter µ. Lastly, interest rates are
assumed constant and equal to r.
The seller maximizes their discounted expected payoff with respect to the waiting time,
T . Let the expected discounted payoff function be denoted by u(T, λ, µ, pmin, pmax, r). The
following lemma characterizes this quantity.
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Lemma 2.1
u(T, λ, µ, pmin, pmax, r) =
(
−
g(T, λ, µ, r)(pmax − pmin)
(1− f(T, µ))2
)
×
(
f(T, µ)eλTf(T,µ) −
1
λT
(eλTf(T,µ) − 1)− eλTf(T,µ) +
1
λT
(eλT − 1)
)
+
pmaxg(T, λ, µ, r)(e
λT − eλTf(T,µ))
1− f(T, µ)
(2.1)
where f(T, µ) = 1− 1
µT
(1− e−µT ) and g(T, λ, µ, r) = (1− f(T, µ))e−rTe−λT .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This lemma is used in the following two cases.
2.2 No List Price
In this case the seller’s reservation price, R, is private information. The seller does not post
a list price, and considers all offers until the end of the waiting time. Here the seller has a
minimum price for a sale, but doesn’t limit the upside payoff.
Using the thinning principle for Poisson processes, Resnick (1992), the expected dis-
counted payoff, v(T, λ, µ, R, pmin, pmax, r), can be computed as in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 v(T, λ, µ, R, pmin, pmax, r) = u(T, λthinned, µ, R, pmax, r) where λthinned = λ
pmax−R
pmax−pmin
.
Figure 2 plots the expected discounted payoff as in Corollary 2.1. The values of the
parameters used in this figure are contained in the appendix. The expected discounted
payoff equals zero at T = 0, increases to a maximum value, and then starts to decrease.
This plot shows that there is an optimal waiting time.
2.3 Public List Price
In this case the seller announces a list price, L, and still has a private reservation price,
R. This case can be simplified by dividing the payoff function into two regions. From
7
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Figure 2: Expected discounted payoff in the case without a list price.
Corollary 2.1, if the seller does not receive any offers higher than L, the payoff becomes
u(T, λ L−R
pmax−pmin
, µ, R, L, r). The remaining region is when offers higher than L are received.
The payoff function, w(T, λ, µ, R, L, pmin, pmax, r), is obtained by considering these two re-
gions.
Theorem 2.1
w(T, λ, µ, R, L, pmin, pmax, r) =
(
1− e−λTy
)(pmax + L
2
)(
λy
λy + r
)
+ e−λTyu(T, λx, µ, R, L, r) (2.2)
where x = L−R
pmax−pmin
and y = pmax−L
pmax−pmin
.
Proof. If the seller does not receive any offer higher than L, the payoff equals
u(T, λ x, µ, R, L, r). Given that there is an offer higher than L, our payoff equals pmax+L
2
E
[
e−rβ
]
where β is a random variable representing the arrival time of the first offer greater than L. If
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Figure 3: Expected discounted payoff in the case with an announced list price
y = pmax−L
pmax−pmin
, then E
[
e−rβ
]
equals the moment-generating function of an exponential random
variable with parameter λy. Thus, E
[
e−rβ
]
= λy
λy+r
. To find the resulting expected payoff,
we only need the probability of receiving an offer greater than L, which equals
(
1− e−λTy
)
.
As a result, our expected payoff function is the sum of these two parts multiplied by their
corresponding probabilities. 
Figure 3 graphs the expected discounted payoff with respect to the waiting time for a pub-
lic list price. The values of the parameters used in this graph are contained in the appendix.
Note that the expected payoff function is strictly increasing in T with an asymptote:
lim
T→∞
w(T, λ, µ, R, L, pmin, pmax, r) =
(
pmax + L
2
)(
λy
λy + r
)
. (2.3)
When T increases, the payoff function is dominated by the region where the seller receives
an offer greater than L. Unlike the first model, the asymptotic payoff is not a function
of the waiting time, T , and therefore, does not diminish with respect to T . By setting a
longer waiting time, the seller can almost surely get an offer greater than L (and because
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the discount factor, E
[
e−rβ
]
, does not depend on T .) This is due to the properties of the
exponential distribution for the first offer greater than L. This figure does not imply that
the seller waits an infinite amount of time to sell the asset. Rather, it only implies that the
seller makes a conservative estimate of the maximum waiting time before the sale process
starts.
The reason why the expected discounted payoff is increasing in T is because there is no
specific utility function associated with the seller’s motivation to sell the asset (see Glower,
Haurin and Hendershott (1998) who show that the seller’s motivation is a significant factor
in determining the selling time and the sale price). We can introduce this utility based sales
motivation via a utility function, U(.), defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 U(D, T ) = De−γT where D is the discounted payoff, T is the waiting time,
and γ ≥ 0 is a time impatience parameter.
As the time impatient parameter γ increases, the seller is more motivated to sell the
asset. This selling motivation enables the model to incorporate different individuals, who
have different sale processes even under the same market conditions. With this assumption,
the expected utility function, z(.), can be written as follows.
Corollary 2.2
z(T, λ, µ, R, L, pmin, pmax, r, γ) = E
[
U(.)
]
(2.4)
= e−γTw(T, λ, µ, R, L, pmin, pmax, r) (2.5)
Figure 4 plots the expected utility with respect to the waiting time in the case of a public
list price. The parameter values used in this graph are contained in the appendix.
2.4 An Analysis of OWT
This section defines the OWT and analyzes its comparative statistics with respect to the
model’s parameters. We use the public list price case of Section 2.3 as our underlying model.
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Figure 4: Expected utility in the case of an announced list price
Definition 2.2 Let T ∗ denote the OWT that maximizes expected utility. Then,
T ∗ = argmax {T ≥ 0 : z(T, λ, µ, R, L, pmin, pmax, r, γ)}. (2.6)
Since the expected utility function is continuous and its first derivative has a unique sign
change from positive to negative, a global maximum exists. We plot T ∗ as a function of
model’s parameters in Figures 5 through 7. The parameter values used in the graphs are
contained in the appendix.
The graph on the left side of Figure 5 shows the change in T ∗ with respect to the arrival
intensity of offers, λ, and interest rates r. As λ increases, the seller chooses a smaller waiting
time because he expects to get sufficiently many offers and, thus, he avoids a large utility loss
from waiting longer. This graph illustrates this point with a decreasing concave-up function
when interest rates are low. However, when interest rates are high, we see that T ∗ actually
increases when λ is small and increasing. This implies that in this region, the amount of
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Figure 5: Optimal waiting time as a function of arrival intensity and interest rate (left) and
optimal waiting time as a function of withdrawal intensity and interest rate (right)
additional offers created by higher demand is worth the wait.
The graph on the right-side graph of Figure 5 shows the change in T ∗ with respect to the
withdrawal intensity of the buyers, µ, and interest rates r. As µ increases, the seller chooses
a longer waiting time because he wants to increase the number of offers, as in the case of
the increasing arrival intensity. Figure 5 shows that, when interest rates are high, there is a
constant optimal waiting time. In this circumstance, since the discount rate is high, small
changes in the withdrawal intensity do not affect T ∗.
Both of these graphs show that interest rates are indirectly proportional with T ∗. This
is intuitive because the seller does not want to wait long in a high interest rate environment.
Figure 6 illustrates that the intensities of offer arrivals λ and offer withdrawals µ do not
always create the opposite impact on T ∗. For small values of λ and µ, T ∗ increases when
they both rise above a certain threshold. Only after this threshold do they begin to create
the opposite effect.
The left-side of Figure 7 shows the change in T ∗ with respect to the list price and interest
rates. When the list price increases, the OWT increases. However, as Figure 7 illustrates,
if our list price is already high, increasing the list price further diminishes the probability of
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Figure 6: Optimal waiting time as a function of arrival intensity and withdrawal intensity
receiving an offer greater than this new value and, thus, there is no incentive to wait longer.
The right-side of Figure 7 shows the change in T ∗ with respect to the reservation price and
interest rates. As R increases, the seller waits longer because, using the thinning principle
in Poisson processes, this case implies a decreasing λ. As we have seen earlier, decreasing
the arrival intensity results in a larger T ∗.
3 Modeling Real Estate Price Evolutions
The previous sections of the paper characterized the optimal waiting time when selling an
illiquid asset. The remainder of the paper studies the time evolution of real estate sale prices
in a market where sellers maximize their payoffs by considering the optimal waiting time.
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Figure 7: Optimal waiting time as a function of list price and interest rate (left) and optimal
waiting time as a function of reservation price and interest rate (right)
3.1 Stochastic Demand and Interest Rates
The real estate market price evolution is strongly affected by changes in the broader economy
such as recessionary or expansionary cycles and by interest rates shocks. In our model, we
model the recessionary and expansionary cycles with a stochastic demand, λ(t). The demand,
λ(t), will be a function of interest rates, r(t), and the announced list prices, L(t), i.e.
λ(t) = g
(
r(t), L(t)
)
(3.7)
where r(t) is stochastic and L(t) is non-random for the seller.
It is assumed that L(t) is non-increasing with L(t) ≥ R > 0 for all t ≥ 0, where R is the
seller’s reservation price. Offers arrive according to a non-homogenous Poisson process with
stochastic arrival intensity, λ(t). Let Ft be the σ-algebra generated by {r(s)}0≤s≤t, and N(t)
be the number of arrivals in [0, t]. Then,
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P{N(t) = n} = E
[
Λ(t)n
exp(−Λ(t))
n!
]
, and
P{N(t) = n|Ft} = Λ(t)
n exp(−Λ(t))
n!
(3.8)
where Λ(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds.
Offers’ values come from an independent distribution, Fξ with density fξ, where ξ repre-
sents the intensity of a generic offer. ξi and Ai, i ≥ 1, represent the intensity and the arrival
time of the ith offer, respectively. Given Ft and the number of offers in [0, t], offer arrival
times are independently distributed over [0, t] with conditional density
fA|{Ft,N(t)=n}(a) =
λ(a)
Λ(t)
.
After an offer arrives, it is withdrawn after a random time with continuous distribution
function Fτ , where τ is the withdrawal time. It is not hard, however, to extend the analysis
to more general offer withdrawal time distributions. We let τi, for i ≥ 1, represents the
withdrawal time of the ith offer. All τi’s are assumed to be independent from one another.
Without loss of generality, we set ξ0 = A0 = τ0 = 0. Let β be the arrival time of the first
offer greater than the list price. Then,
β = inf{Ai : ξi ≥ L(Ai), i ≥ 1}.
We prove three theorems characterizing the expected payoff to the seller. In the first case,
the seller announces a time-dependent list price. In this case, the asset is sold whenever there
is an offer greater than the ask price. This is the most general case containing the others as
subcases. In the second case, the list price of the asset does not change with time. Finally,
in the third case, the seller does not announce a list price. He waits an optimal amount of
time and then chooses the best available offer greater than the reservation price.
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For the first case, the discounted payoff function, X(t), at time t is:
X(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
·
(
max
0≤i≤N(t)
ξi · 1 {ξi≥R} · 1 {τi≥t−Ai}
)
· 1 {β>t}
+ exp
(
−
∫ β
0
r(s)ds
)
ξi(β)1 {β≤t} (3.9)
where ξi(β) is the offer value at β. The first term in (3.9) accounts for the situation where
all offers until time t are smaller than the list price. The second term corresponds to the
situation where there is an offer price greater than the list price before time t. We have the
following theorem for the expected discounted payoff at time t.
Theorem 3.1 Let P (t) = E[X(t)] and P (t|Ft) = E[X(t)|Ft]. Then, P (t) = E[P (t|Ft)], and
P (t|Ft) = e
−
R t
0 r(s)dseΛ(t)(ϕ(t)−1)
(
L0 −
∫ L0
0
e−Λ(t)ψ(t,y)dy
)
+
(
1− eΛ(t)(ϕ(t)−1)
) ∫ t
0
∫ ∞
L(a)
λ(a) exp
(
−
∫ a
0
r(s)ds
)
Λ(t)
(
1− Fξ
(
L(a)
)) fξ(x)xdxda (3.10)
where ψ(t, y) = 1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)
(
1 − Fτ (t − a)
)(
Fξ
(
L(a) ∨ y
)
− Fξ
(
R ∨ y
))
da and ϕ(t) =
1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)Fξ
(
L(a)
)
da.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The difficulty in proving Theorem 3.1 is that a changing list price introduces a coupling
between the offer intensity and the arrival time.
In the second case, we assume that L(t) is a constant. Here, the seller’s payoff can also
be written exactly as in (3.9). Theorem 3.2 gives us the seller’s expected payoff at time t for
this case. We do not provide a proof because it is similar to that of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2 Let P (t) = E[X(t)] and P (t|Ft) = E[X(t)|Ft]. If L(t) = L ≥ R > 0 is
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constant, then P (t) = E
[
P (t|Ft)
]
and
P (t|Ft) = e
−
R t
0 r(s)dseΛ(t)(Fξ(L)−1)
(
L−
∫ L
0
e−Λ(t)ψ(t,y)dy
)
+
(
1− eΛ(t)(Fξ(L)−1)
) ∫ t
0
∫ ∞
L(a)
λ(a) exp
(
−
∫ a
0
r(s)ds
)
Λ(t)
(
1− Fξ
(
L(a)
)) fξ(x)xdxda (3.11)
where ψ(t, y) =
(
Fξ(L ∨ y)− Fξ(R ∨ y)
)(
1− 1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)Fτ (t− a)da
)
.
Finally, in the third case, the seller does not announce a list price. In this case, his payoff
process at time t can be written as
X(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
·
(
max
0≤i≤N(t)
ξi · 1 {ξi≥R} · 1 {τi≥t−Ai}
)
. (3.12)
The simplicity of (3.12) compared to (3.9) results in a simplification in the expected
payoff formula at time t, which is given in Theorem 3.3. Again, we do not provide a proof
because it is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.3 Let P (t) = E [X(t)] and P (t|Ft) = E [X(t)|Ft]. If the seller does not an-
nounce any list price (i.e., L =∞), then P (t) = E [P (t|Ft)] and
P (t|Ft) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)∫ ∞
0
(1− exp (−Λ(t)ψ(t, y))) dy, (3.13)
where ψ(t, y) = (1− Fξ(R ∨ y))
(
1− 1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)Fτ (t− a)da
)
.
Further simplifications to Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are possible depending on the dis-
tribution of the offer intensities, the distribution of offer waiting times, and the distribution
of the stochastic process governing the offer arrival times.
3.2 The Microstructure of Housing Markets
This section uses the previous model via simulation to show how the list price of a house
changes over time, if the seller uses an optimal sale time. We focus on a single house and
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track its price evolution for a given period of time. During this horizon, the house may
be sold a number of times and the resulting sequence of sale prices constitutes the price
evolution. For each owner of the house, the model evolves similarly.
3.2.1 The Occupation Period
A new owner’s occupation starts after the sale of the house. The buyer (new owner) knows
how much he paid for the asset and this constitutes his reservation price, R. The owner will
try to sell the asset for at least this amount when he posts the asset for sale. We assume
that each owner lives in the house for a certain amount of time, O years, which may vary
from individual to individual. Within this period, he does not want to sell the asset unless
there is a shock (such as relocation necessity, unsuitability of the asset after a change in the
size of his family, personal insolvency or bankruptcy, default and foreclosure, etc.). If the
owner of the house does not realize a shock, he will not try to sell the asset until O years
has passed.
3.2.2 Personal Crises and Profit Opportunities
There are two types of exogenous shocks to the owner of the house:
• Personal crises: If the owner encounters an external shock that is not market-related
(such as losing his job, family- or job-related relocation necessity, personal insolvency,
defaulting on the loan, etc.), he will immediately try to sell the house. This personal
crisis could represent a default on the loan, a foreclosure, and the transfer of ownership
to the bank, who would then put the house on the market. Including default and
foreclosure in the personal crises is essential for relating our price evolution to that
experienced in the recent subprime mortgage market crisis.
• Market related profit opportunities: After using the house for O years, the owner awaits
an optimal market environment to post the house for sale. While waiting for the
optimal market environment, he still faces the possibility of a personal crisis. We
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assume that the owner posts the asset for sale whenever the interest rates fall below a
certain threshold, φ. At this level, the owner expects to receive many offers exceeding
his reservation price.
As a result of these two exogenous shocks, the house will eventually be offered for sale.
Denoting the time to personal crisis by ω and the time to a possible profit opportunity by
pi, then time to posting the house for sale, υ, is
υ = min(ω, pi) where pi = inf(t ≥ X : r(t) ≤ φ). (3.14)
Consequently, υ is the total occupation time, after which the house is posted for sale with
an initial list price, L0 ≥ R. The reservation price R is private.
3.2.3 The Sale Process with an OWT
After the house is posted for sale, the seller sets an optimal waiting time, OWT, which max-
imizes his expected utility. During the OWT, he collects offers from prospective buyers and
sells the asset immediately if he receives an offer greater than the current list price. Everyone
in the market knows the list price, L(T ), but they do not know the seller’s reservation price,
R. In our model, the list price is a function of T , and gradually converges to R.4 We assume
that L(T ) = R + (L0 − R)e
−ζT where L0 is the initial list price and ζ is a positive real
number.
Let p1(T1), ..., pk(Tk) be the offers received during waiting time where pk(Tk) is the kth
offer received at time Tk. The owner sells the house at time Tk if k satisfies:
pk(Tk) ≥ L(Tk) and pm(Tm) < L(Tm) ∀m < k (3.15)
If the owner does not receive any offers greater than the list price, but receives offers exceeding
R, then the owner sells the house to the highest available offer, p, at the end of OWT. That
is, if ∃m such that m ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1, n}, pm(Tm) ≥ R and pm(Tm) is not withdrawn, then
4Note that T represents the waiting time and t is the actual time.
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p = max (pk1(Tk1), ..., pki(Tki)) where i is the number of the available offers that are not
withdrawn until the end of OWT (Assume i ≥ 1).
If there is no offer exceeding R at the end of the OWT, then the owner must decrease
his reservation and list price, and re-posts the house for sale.
To complete the price evolution analysis, we use the framework introduced in Section 2.3.
We assume that buyers make their offers at random times according to a non-homogeneous
Poisson distribution whose intensities are defined by the demand function, λ(t, r(t), L(T )).
At these random times, they offer a price distributed uniformly arising from their valuations
of the asset. Buyers also withdraw their offers according to a known random process. Differ-
ent from the model in Section 2.3, the arrival intensity of the offers equals λ(t, r(t), L(T )).
Interest rates in this analysis are no longer constant, but stochastic. If we denote the ex-
pected utility function by Y(T, λ(t, T ), µ, R, L(T ), pmin, pmax, r(t), γ), then OWT is defined
as
Definition 3.1 T ∗ = argmax{T ≥ 0 : Y(T, λ(t, T ), µ, R, L(T ), pmin, pmax, r(t), γ)}.
3.2.4 Updating Reservation and List Prices
There are two different scenarios for updating the list and reservation prices. If the seller
sells the house before the end of the OWT, the new reservation price for the next period
equals the agreed sale price (as the buyer of the house would not want to sell it for less). If
the distribution of the offers lies between pmin and pmax, then the initial post price L0 equals
pmax and L(T ) gradually decreases from L0 to R during the sale process.
If the seller does not succeed in selling the house, a new period starts for this sale process
with lower reservation and list prices. The seller chooses a new reservation price which is
between R and pmin and sets L0 to R. With these adjustments, he increases the probability
of selling the house in the next period.
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4 The Simulation
This section presents the simulation results for the price evolution process.
4.1 The Model Parameters
We assume that interest rates evolve according to a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) process:
dr(t) = κ(θ − r(t))dt+ σ
√
r(t)dW (t).
We assume that λ(t, r(t), L(T )) takes the following functional form
λ(t, r(t), L(T )) =
K1
r(t)
+
K2
L(T )
, (4.16)
where K1 and K2 are constants. As either interest rates or the list price increases, the
probability of offers decline.
We first simulate occupation periods and exogenous shocks. The sale process starts either
with a personal shock or a profit opportunity. For each sale process, we numerically calcu-
late T ∗ and model the offer arrival times using the demand function as a non-homogeneous
Poisson process. At the arrival times, we generate independent offers using a uniform dis-
tribution around pmin and pmax. For the withdrawal times of the offers, we use exponential
distribution with parameter µ. At the end of the period, we update our reservation and list
prices depending on the outcome of the sale process. If there is a sale, the new reservation
price equals R and L0 became pmax. If there is no sale, then the new reservation price equals
R+pmin
2
and L0 takes the value of R. A new period starts with these new parameters, cur-
rent level of interest rates and demand. The appendix includes the parameters used in the
simulation.
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Figure 8: Evolution of optimal waiting time in a single realization of interest rates and a
stochastic demand function
4.2 Results
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the OWT over a four-year period along with the demand
intensity and interest rates for a single realization. This graph differs from Figure 5 in that
it captures the evolution of all the parameters of the model. The horizontal axis no longer
represents the waiting time, but instead shows the actual simulation time.
This figure shows that as interest rates decrease, the demand intensity and the OWT
increase. With the increase in the demand intensity and the decrease in the interest rates
level, OWT decreases since, in these circumstances, the seller gets more offers and his payoff is
discounted by a lower factor. This figure also demonstrates that changing market conditions
have a broad impact on the house sale process. In a low-interest rate and high-demand
environment, the seller keeps the house on the market for a shorter time than he would in a
high-interest and low-demand environment.
Figure 9 illustrates the house sale price along with the corresponding functions of interest
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Figure 9: Single price evolution of a real asset in a realization of interest rates and a stochastic
demand function
rates and demand intensities over a fifty-year period. The price evolution in the third row
shows the random occupation periods, times of exogenous shocks due to personal crises or
profit opportunities. It also includes whether or not the price process results in success
with the appropriate labels shown in the legend of Figure 10. This figure extends the price
evolution shown in Figure 9.
Figure 10 studies the decision process of the seller. The occupation period, decision of
sale, time on the market, and time of the sale are illustrated in the figure. Until the moment
of sale, all of these time periods are shown at the same price level which constitutes the price
that the seller paid at his initial purchase of the house.
In Figure 10, pink circles represent the occupation period in which the seller decides not
to sell the asset. Pink circles are always followed by a black or red dot which represents
the decision of sale due to a either a profit opportunity or a personal crisis, respectively. At
the time of sale decision, the seller sets an OWT, taking the current market conditions into
account. The waiting period is shown by the blue circles. After this waiting time, a green or
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Figure 10: Single price evolution of a real asset with illustration of subperiods and sale or
no sale outcomes
magenta dot follows, signifying the event of sale and no-sale respectively. If there is a sale,
a new period starts with the occupation period of the new owner of the house.
If the seller does not sell the house, he lowers the reservation and list prices and sets a
new OWT by using the new parameters and current market conditions. Blue circles follow
the magenta dot in the case of no-sale. In this second sale attempt, he may still sell the
asset for a price higher than his initial reservation price, but this probability is less than in
the first attempt. Our results illustrate this conclusion, as in the figure, four cases result in
no-sales, only one of which is sold for a price higher than the initial reservation price. The
seller may not sell the house in this attempt either. In this case, he will be further lower
his reservation and list prices. However, this probability is also lower: out of four cases of
no-sale, only one seller encountered two successive failed attempts.
Figure 11 graphs the expected price evolution of the real asset without considering occu-
pation periods or exogenous shocks. This figure shows the mean sale price if the seller posts
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Figure 11: Expected price evolution of a real asset in a single realization of interest rates
and a stochastic demand function
the house for sale at a given time. This figure still assumes that the seller sets an optimal
waiting time and has his own reservation price. This figure supports the conclusions from
the single simulation. Note that the expected sale price declines (increases) with a decrease
(increase) in the demand and a rise (fall) in interest rates.
Our simulation results show that the fluctuation in house prices are driven by interest
rates, demand, and time-on-the-market (TOM). In Figure 9, interest rates increase between
the 25th and 40th year, and this increase results in two unsuccessful sale attempts in Figure
10. During this period, the reservation price of the house is close to its maximum and, with
the high-interest and low-demand environment, the seller could not succeed in selling the
house in two trials. Eventually, the seller sells the asset in the third trial with a significant
discount compared to his reservation price.
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4.3 The Subprime Lending Crisis
Our simulation provides some insights into the housing market crash observed during the
subprime lending crisis (for a review see Crouhy, Jarrow, Turnbull [8]). The record low
borrowing rates during 1999-2004 increased housing affordability with the corresponding
up-trend in home prices as shown in Figure 1. When borrowing rates increased and home
buyers’ mortgage contracts began to reset to these higher rates, low credit borrowers had a
difficult time making their monthly payments. They either defaulted or were forced to put
their homes up for sale. This coincides exactly with our modeling of a personal crisis. Due
to this shock, the home owner had to sell his house in an unfavorable market: high interest
rates and low demand. As shown in our simulation results, the expected price in such a
market environment is low.
Another catalyst for subprime defaults were the higher reservation prices locked in during
the bull period. Although demand should have been low during this period, borrowers still
obtained financing - helped by the lower standards of the mortgage originators. To support
this view, note that during 2002-2006, the Combined Loan to Value (CLTV) ratio increased.
In the subprime category, it rose to 88% from 81% and in Alt-A category, it rose to 85%
from 73%5. When the subprime homes were put on the market, they could not get any
offers matching their list price. As we discussed in our simulation, in a high-interest and
low demand environment, it is very difficult to sell a property with a high reservation price.
Since most of the subprime borrowers paid for their homes at record high values, they had to
lower their reservation prices during the sale process. This result is similar to our successive
no-sale events when the reservation price of the owner is close to pmax.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new model to describe the evolution of housing prices. We include
exogenous shocks to the real estate market that may be the result of a profit opportunity
5Source: UBS Mortgage Research.
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or personal crisis. We investigate the sale process by introducing a new model for analyzing
the time-on-the-market (TOM) with a new construct, the optimal waiting time (OWT).
We study the comparative statistics of the OWT with respect to the model’s parameters
such as the arrival intensity, the offer withdrawal (cancelation) rates, and interest rates.
We specifically look at the pairwise impact of these parameters and how they affect the
resulting OWT in the different regions of the surface. We incorporate our theory of the
OWT into a price evolution analysis that also includes an occupation period, a personal
crisis or profit-taking opportunity, and the deterministic updating of model parameters with
the occurrence of the sale. Our model specifically considers the occurrence of sale, no sale
conditions, and how the seller responds to the no sale scenario. Our simulation results show
that it becomes more difficult to sell a house in a high-interest, low-demand environment
and that these conditions may require the seller to sell the asset below his initial reservation
price. This results in a dynamic, time-dependent, and stochastic house price process which
provides some insights into the recent subprime credit crisis.
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A Appendix: Auxiliary Model
We will derive the auxiliary model in this appendix. Buyers make offers with exp(λ) and
their offers are distributed uniformly with U(pmin, pmax). The seller’s reservation price is pmin.
After making an offer, a buyer may withdraw his offer with distribution exp(µ). Interest
rate is constant and equals r. The seller wants to maximize expected payoff with respect to
waiting time, T . Let N(T ) be the number of offers received by time T and ξi be the offer
from buyer i, Bi, at the arrival time, Ai, and ξ(i) be the ith minimum offer received by the
seller. With these assumptions, the discounted expected payoff, u(.), is a function of T , λ,
µ, pmin, pmax, and r.
u(.) = E [E [X|N(T ) = n]]
=
∞∑
n=0
E
[
ξ(n)e
−rT1 [Bn is still interested] + ξ(n−1)e
−rT1 [Bn−1 is still interested and ξ(n) is withdrawn]
. . .+ ξ(1)e
−rT1 [B1 is still interested and ξ(n)...ξ(2) are withdrawn]|N(T ) = n
]
P (N(T ) = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
n∑
i=1
E
[
ξ(n−i+1)e
−rT1 [Bn−i+1 is still interested and ξ(n)...ξ(n−i+2) are withdrawn]|N(T ) = n
]
×
P (N(T ) = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
n∑
i=1
E
[
ξ(n−i+1)|N(T ) = n
]
× E
[
e−rT1 [Bn−i+1 is still interested]|N(T ) = n
]
×
E
[
1 [ξ(n)...ξ(n−i+2) are withdrawn]|N(T ) = n
]
P (N(T ) = n) .
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Each of the components of the sum is as follows
E
[
ξ(i)|N(T ) = n
]
= pmin +
(pmax − pmin)i
n+ 1
,
E
[
1 [Bi is still interested]|N(T ) = n
]
=
∫ T
0
1
T
e−µxdx =
1
µT
(1− e−µT ) := 1− f(T ),
E
[
1 [ξ(n)...ξ(n−i+2) are withdrawn]|N(T ) = n
]
= [f(T )]i−1,
P (N(T ) = n) =
(λT )ne−λT
n!
.
Using these components, expected payoff becomes
u(.) =
∞∑
n=0
n∑
i=1
(
pmin +
(pmax − pmin)(n− i+ 1)
n+ 1
)
e−rT (1− f(T ))(f(T ))i−1
(
(λT )ne−λT
n!
)
= g(T )
∞∑
n=0
(λT )n
n!
n∑
i=1
(
pmax(f(T ))
i−1 −
(pmax − pmin)
n + 1
i(f(T ))i−1
)
,
where g(T ) = (1− f(T ))e−rTe−λT . We use the following facts in the final computation.
n∑
i=1
ixi−1 =
d(
∑n
i=1 x
i)
dx
=
d(1−x
n+1
1−x
)
dx
=
nxn+1 − (n+ 1)xn + 1
(1− x)2
and
n∑
i=1
xi−1 =
1− xn
1− x
.
Finally, the discounted expected payoff equals
u(T, λ, µ, pmin, pmax, r) = g(T )
∞∑
n=0
(λT )n
n!
[ pmax − pmin
(n+ 1)(1− f(T ))2
(
nf(T )n+1 − (n+ 1)f(T )n + 1
)
+ pmax
1− f(T )n
1− f(T )
]
=
−g(T )(pmax − pmin)
(1− f(T ))2
(f(T )eλTf(T ) −
1
λT
(eλTf(T ) − 1)− eλTf(T )
+
1
λT
(eλT − 1)) +
pmaxg(T )(e
λT − eλTf(T ))
1− f(T )
,
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where f(T ) = 1− 1
µT
(1− e−µT ) and g(T ) = (1− f(T ))e−rTe−λT .
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B Appendix: Theorem 3.1
We first establish some auxiliary results that will be used while proving Theorem 3.1. Lemma
B.1 gives us the formula for the conditional probability, which is conditioned on Ft and
N(t) = n, that an offer value is smaller than the announced list price at its arrival time.
Lemma B.1 Let ϕ(t) = P{ξ1 < L(A1)|Ft, N(t) = n} for n ≥ 1. Then,
ϕ(t) =
1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)Fξ
(
L(a)
)
da.
Proof. Given A1 = a, the event {ξ1 < L(A1)} is independent of Ft and N(t). Thus,
ϕ(t) =
∫ t
0
fA|{Ft,N(t)=n}(a)P{ξ1 < L(a)}da
=
1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)Fξ
(
L(a)
)
da.

The following lemma provides the formula for the conditional probability, which is con-
ditioned on Ft and N(t) = n, that none of the offers arrived in the time interval [0, t] is
greater than the announced sale at their arrival times.
Lemma B.2 P{β > t|Ft, N(t) = n} = ϕ(t)
n for n ≥ 1.
Proof.
P{β > t|Ft, N(t) = n} = P
( n⋂
i=0
{ξi < L(Ai)}|Ft, N(t) = n
)
= P{ξ1 < L(A1)|Ft, N(t) = n}
n = ϕ(t)n.

Now, we calculate the conditional density of β, fβ|{Ft,N(t)=n,β≤t}(s), conditioned on Ft,
N(t) = n, and β ≤ t.
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Lemma B.3 fβ|{Ft,N(t)=n,β≤t}(s) =
λ(s)
Λ(t)
.
Proof. Let i(β) be the index of the offer at time β. Then,
P{β ≤ s|Ft, N(t) = n, β ≤ t} = P{Ai(β) ≤ s|Ft, N(t) = n, β ≤ t}.
Since β ≤ t, we know that i(β) ≤ n. Given N(t) = n and Ft, all offer arrival times are
independently distributed over [0, t] according to density λ(s)
Λ(t)
. Thus,
P{β ≤ s|Ft, N(t) = n, β ≤ t} =
Λ(s)
Λ(t)
.
Thus, fβ|{Ft,N(t)=n,β≤t}(s) =
λ(s)
Λ(t)
. 
In Lemma B.4, we derive the conditional probability, conditioned on Ft and N(t) = n,
of an offer, which is not withdrawn up to time t and greater than the reservation price but
not exceeding the list price at its arrival time, to be greater than a positive real number y.
Lemma B.4 Let ψ(t, y) = P{ξ11 {R≤ξ1<L(A1)}1 {τ1≥t−A1} > y|Ft, N(t) = n} for n ≥ 1. Then,
ψ(t, y) =
1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)
(
1− Fτ (t− a)
)(
Fξ
(
L(a) ∨ y
)
− Fξ
(
R ∨ y
))
da. (2.17)
Proof. Conditioned on A1 = a, events {τ1 ≥ t − A1} and {R ≤ ξ1 < L(A1)} are
independent of each other as well as being independent of Ft and N(t). Thus,
ψ(t, y) =
1
Λ(t)
∫ a
0
λ(a)P{τ1 ≥ t− a}P{ξ11 {R≤ξ1<L(a)} > y}
=
1
Λ(t)
∫ t
0
λ(a)
(
1− Fτ (t− a)
)(
Fξ
(
L(a) ∨ y
)
− Fξ
(
R ∨ y
))
da.

Let pn(t) = P{N(t) = n|Ft}. The following summation formula will also be used in the
proof of Theorem 3.1, and gives us the conditional moment generating function of a Poisson
process with stochastic intensity.
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Lemma B.5 For q > 0, the following holds.
∞∑
n=0
pn(t)q
n = exp
(
Λ(t)(q − 1)
)
.
We now start proving Theorem 3.1. Let X1(t) be the first term in (3.9), and X2(t) be
the second term in (3.9). Let us define P1(t|Ft) = E[X1(t)|Ft], and P2(t|Ft) = E[X2(t)|Ft].
We first calculate P1(t|Ft).
P1(t|Ft) =
∞∑
n=0
pn(t)E
[
X1(t)|Ft, N(t) = n
]
.
Put M(t) = max0≤i≤N(t) ξi1 {ξi≥R}1 {τi≥t−Ai}. Then,
E[X1(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] = e
−
R t
0 r(s)dsE
[
M(t)1 {β>t}|Ft, N(t) = n
]
. (2.18)
The expectation in (2.18) can be calculated by conditioning on the event {β > t}.
E
[
M(t)1 {β>t}|Ft, N(t) = n
]
= P{β > t|Ft, N(t) = n}E
[
M(t)|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t
]
= ϕ(t)nE
[
M(t)|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t
]
.
Since M(t) is positive, its conditional expectation can be calculated by integrating
P{M(t) > y|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t} with respect to y over [0,∞]. Let us calculate P{M(t) >
y|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t}.
P{M(t) > y|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t}
= 1−
(
1− P
{
ξ11 {ξ1≥R}1 {τ1≥t−A1} > y|Ft, N(t) = n, ξ1 < L(A1)
})n
= 1−
(
1−
P{ξ11 {R≤ξ1≤L(A1)}1 {τ1≥t−A1} > y|Ft, N(t) = n}
P{ξ1 < L(A1)|Ft, N(t) = n}
)n
= 1−
(
1−
ψ(t, y)
ϕ(t)
)n
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Integrating P{M(t) > y|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t} over y, we obtain E[M(t)|Ft, N(t) = n, β >
t].
E[M(t)|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t] =
∫ ∞
0
P{M(t) > y|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t}dy
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
(
1−
ψ(t, y)
ϕ(t)
)n)
dy. (2.19)
Noting that ψ(t, y) = 0 a.s. when y > L0, we can further simplify (2.19) to
E[M(t)|Ft, N(t) = n, β > t] = L0 −
∫ L0
0
(
1−
ψ(t, y)
ϕ(t)
)n
dy.
As a result, E[X1(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] is equal to
E[X1(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] = e
−
R t
0
r(s)ds
(
L0ϕ(t)
n −
∫ L0
0
(
ϕ(t)− ψ(t, y)
)n
dy
)
.
Now, we average E[X1(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] over N(t). By using Fubini’s theorem and Lemma
B.5, we obtain
P1(t|Ft) = e
−
R t
0 r(s)dseΛ(t)(ϕ(t)−1)
(
L0 −
∫ L0
0
e−Λ(t)ψ(t,y)dy
)
.
Let us now calculate P2(t|Ft). It is equal to
P2(t|Ft) =
∞∑
n=0
pn(t)E[X2(t)|Ft, N(t) = n].
where E[X2(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] is calculated as
E[X2(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] = E
[
e−
R β
0 r(s)dsξi(β)1 {β≤t}|Ft, N(t) = n
]
= P{β ≤ t|Ft, N(t) = n}E
[
e−
R β
0 r(s)dsξi(β)|Ft, N(t) = n, β ≤ t
]
=
(
1− ϕ(t)n
) ∫ t
0
fβ|{Ft,N(t)=n,β≤t}(a)e
−
R a
0
r(s)ds
E
[
ξi(a)
]
.
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The last equality follows from the fact that the magnitude of ξi(β) is independent of Ft and
N(t), and only depends on a given the event {β = a}. Note also that
E[ξi(a)] = E[ξ1|ξ1 ≥ L(a)]
=
∫∞
L(a)
xfξ(x)dx
1− Fξ
(
L(a)
)
Thus,
E[X2(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] =
(
1− ϕ(t)n
) ∫ t
0
∫ ∞
L(a)
fβ|{Ft,N(t)=n,β≤t}(a)
exp(−
∫ a
0
r(s)ds)
1− Fξ
(
L(a)
) xfξ(x)dxda
=
(
1− ϕ(t)n
) ∫ t
0
∫ ∞
L(a)
λ(a) exp
(
−
∫ a
0
r(s)ds
)
Λ(t)
(
1− Fξ
(
L(a)
)) fξ(x)xdxda.
P2(t|Ft) is obtained by averaging E[X2(t)|Ft, N(t) = n] over N(t). By using Lemma B.5, we
obtain
P2(t|Ft) =
(
1− eΛ(t)(ϕ(t)−1)
) ∫ t
0
∫ ∞
L(a)
λ(a) exp
(
−
∫ a
0
r(s)ds
)
Λ(t)
(
1− Fξ
(
L(a)
)) fξ(x)xdxda.
This completes the proof since P (t|Ft) = P1(t|Ft) + P2(t|Ft).
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C Appendix: Parameter Assumptions
Parameter Value
Arrival intensity (λ) 5
Withdrawal intensity (µ) 5
Interest rate (r) 0.1
Reservation price (R) 140
List price (L) 180
Waiting averseness (γ) 0.1
pmin 100
pmax 200
Table 1: Default parameter values in OWT analysis in Section 2
Parameter Value
Withdrawal intensity (µ) 10
Occupation period (O) U(4, 6)
Rate of personal crisis Exp(10)
Initial reservation price(R0) 140
Initial list price (L0) 200
Waiting averseness (γ) 0.8
Interest rate threshold (φ) 0.06
pmin 100
pmax 200
K1 0.5
K2 1000
θ 0.1
σ 0.08
κ 0.25
r0 0.09
Table 2: Default parameter values in the simulation
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